Research
“Women Lean Back When Representing Others in Competitions”, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 2024.
Abstract: This study examined the role that being a ‘representative’ plays in competition behavior of women and men through a laboratory experiment where self-representing and other-representing individuals had to decide whether to enter a mix-gender tournament that involved performing in a male-stereotyped task. While self-representing men and women exhibited very similar performance and competitiveness behaviors, women ‘representatives’ leaned back. Controlling for differences in performance, female ‘representatives’ were less likely to enter into competitions than male ‘representatives’ and self-representing women. The leaning back of female ‘representatives’ from competition entry as compared to self-representing women is largely attributed to these women experiencing lower levels of confidence and being less likely to enter a competition when they guessed their performance to be less than the best. Furthermore, compared to male ‘representatives’, female ‘representatives’ were significantly less confident in their abilities, explaining the gender gap in competition entry amongst other-representing individuals.
“Women Don’t Avoid Competition: They Avoid Competing Against Men - Experimental Evidence from Kenya”, 2023, Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group (with Francisco Campos and Indhira Santos)
Abstract: This study examines gender differences in competitive behavior in Kenya using a series of laboratory experiments. The control condition was designed to assess the baseline competitive behavior and performance in a mixed-gender competitive environment in a stereotypical male domain. To further understand the role of mixed-gender competitive environment on women’s competition behavior, the control condition was replicated with women facing only other women as competitors. The paper also examines gender differences in competition in a high-stakes environment, where the control condition was replicated, but financial stakes were increased by a factor of ten. The study finds significant differences in competition entry between men and women in both the control and high-stakes conditions. These are largely driven by gender differences in preferences for competing in the control condition, and differences in risk and feedback aversion when the stakes are high. Women in the women-only treatment were significantly more competitive than women in the control condition and just as competitive as men in the control condition. These findings suggest that women do not avoid competition; they avoid competing against men.
“Descriptive Norms and Gender Diversity: Reactance from Men”, Journal of Behavioral Public Administration, 2019 (with Iris Bohnet and Alexandra van Geen)
Abstract: Descriptive norms provide social information on others’ typical behaviors and have been shown to lead to prescriptive outcomes by “nudging” individuals towards norm compliance in numerous settings. This paper examines whether descriptive norms lead to prescriptive outcomes in the gender domain. We examine whether such social information can influence the gender distribution of candidates selected by employers in a hiring context. We conduct a series of laboratory experiments where ‘employers’ decide how many male and female ‘employees’ they want to hire for male- and female-typed tasks and examine whether employers are more likely to hire more of one gender when informed that others have done so as well. In this set-up descriptive norms do not have prescriptive effects. In fact, descriptive norms do not affect female employers’ hiring decisions at all and lead to norm reactance and backlash from male employers when informed that others have hired more women.
“Profiting from Parity: Unlocking the Potential of Women’s Businesses in Africa: Main Report”, World Bank Group, 2019 (with Francisco Campos, Indhira Santos, and others)
Abstract: Women play a key role in the economies of sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, sub-SaharanAfrica is the only region where women make up the majority of those who are entrepreneurs. However, a range of impediments render women’s businesses less productive and having fewer employees than those owned by men. This new report, “Profiting from Parity: Unlocking the Potential of Women’s Businesses in Africa”, produced by the World Bank Group’s Africa Gender Innovation Lab and the Finance, Competitiveness and Innovation Global Practice, seeks to focus attention on the challenges that Africa’s women entrepreneurs face and identify practical solutions. The report draws on new, high-quality, household and firm level data to present the clearest evidence to date about the barriers to growth and profitability faced by women entrepreneurs. It goes beyond looking at contextual, endowment and household restrictions in isolation, and, through deep-dive analysis, uncovers new evidence on how social norms, networks and household-level decision making contribute to business performance. It analyzes how they are linked to each other and to women’s strategic business decisions. The report offers policy makers evidence based guidance on designing programs to target multiple obstacles and improve theperformance of women entrepreneurs.
“Improving Outcomes in the Trust Game: The Games People Choose in Oman, the United States, and Vietnam,” In Human Cooperation, Oxford University Press, 2017 (with Iris Bohnet, Richard Zeckhauser, and others)
Abstract: This chapter examines how people in Oman, the United States, and Vietnam deal with trust situations. It offers two trust-fostering mechanisms—a mitigation-based approach (“insurance”), decreasing the principal’s cost of betrayal, and a prevention-based approach (“bonus”), increasing the agent’s benefits of trustworthiness. What choices principals make were measured, as well as how agents respond to them and how both parties’ behaviors compare to a situation where insurance or bonus was assigned by chance. About two-thirds of our principals prefer the safety of the insurance mechanism and about one-third prefer sending a bonus, making themselves vulnerable to the agent. This vulnerability pays off by tripling the likelihood of trustworthiness compared to when insurance is chosen. Still, when a bonus is chosen, only about half of the agents reward trust. This fraction is insufficient to make the principals whole. In terms of expected payoffs principals would be better off with insurance.
“Essays on Gender and Decision Making in Political Economy” (Dissertation), Harvard University, 2016
Abstract: This dissertation contains three essays that address supply side, demand side and political factors that influence the attitudes and decisions that shape women’s economic and political status. It demonstrates how self-expectations and beliefs about relative ability shaped women’s decisions to lean out of competitive environments when representing others; how descriptive norm nudges that favored women and focused on their gains incited male reactance in hiring; and how in the aftermath of the Egyptian Revolution, Egyptian men updated their attitudes towards women’s role in society.